02748nam a22004455i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020001800100020001900118024003100137082001200168100003000180245007500210264004600285300003300331336002600364337002600390338003600416347002400452490006300476505045300539520084000992650002601832650001201858650001701870650002401887650003301911650001601944650001701960650001201977650002401989650003902013710003402052773002002086776003602106830006302142856009702205978-1-4020-3982-9DE-He21320260521092102.0cr nn 008mamaa100301s2006    ne |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a9781402039829  a997814020398297 a10.1007/1-4020-3982-42doi04a1102231 aSneddon, Andrew.eauthor.10aAction and Responsibilityh[electronic resource] /cby Andrew Sneddon. 1aDordrecht :bSpringer Netherlands,c2006.  aIX, 198 p.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy,x1387-6678 ;v180 aTwo Questions -- Ascriptivism Resurrected: The Case for Ascriptivism -- Ascriptivism Defended: The Case Against Ascriptivism -- Responsibility and Causation I: Legal Responsibility -- Responsibility and Causation II: Moral Responsibility -- Foundationalism and the Production Question -- Foundationalism and the Status Question: Strong Productionism -- Nouveau Volitionism -- Weak Productionism -- Concluding Reflections on Ascriptivism and Action.  aWhat makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions. 0aPHILOSOPHY (GENERAL). 0aETHICS. 0aMETAPHYSICS. 0aPHILOSOPHY OF MIND. 0aSOCIAL SCIENCESxPHILOSOPHY.14aPHILOSOPHY.24aMETAPHYSICS.24aETHICS.24aPHILOSOPHY OF MIND.24aPHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.2 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer eBooks08iPrinted edition:z9781402039966 0aLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy,x1387-6678 ;v1840uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3982-4zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY