03652nam a22004695i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020001800100020001900118024003500137082001200172100002700184245013900211264004600350300004200396336002600438337002600464338003600490347002400526490005800550505042200608520161101030650002102641650001502662650002702677650002902704650002402733650002302757650002102780650002302801650002702824650002902851650002302880650003002903710003402933773002002967776003602987830005803023856010103081978-0-387-89670-0DE-He21320260521092020.0cr nn 008mamaa100301s2010    xxu|    s    |||| 0|eng d  a9780387896700  a997803878967007 a10.1007/978-0-387-89670-02doi04a3202231 aKoo, Min Gyo.eauthor.10aIsland Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asiah[electronic resource] :bBetween a Rock and a Hard Place /cby Min Gyo Koo. 1aNew York, NY :bSpringer New York,c2010.  aXX, 208p. 17 illus.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aThe Political Economy of the Asia Pacific,x1866-65070 aEast Asian Island and Maritime Disputes in a World of Globalization -- Conceptual and Theoretical Framework -- Quantitative Analysis of East Asian Island Disputes -- The Island and Maritime Disputes in the East Sea/Sea of Japan -- The Island and Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea -- The Island and Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea -- Maritime Regime Building in East Asia -- Conclusion and Implications.  aThis book explores the three most prominent island disputes in East Asia: the Dokdo/Takeshima, the Senkaku/Diaoyu, and the Paracel and Spratly disputes. These island disputes clearly illustrate the puzzling pattern of continuity and mutual restraint in East Asia's territorial conflicts. In dealing with sovereignty issues, East Asian countries have engaged in varied patterns of diplomatic and military behaviors. In some cases, one can find examples of the aggressive use of military force and intransigent bargaining strategies, while in others military inaction and accommodative diplomacy are equally evident. When and why do disputants pursue conflictual policies? Conversely, why do they at other times seek the containment, if not the resolution, of territorial disputes by shelving thorny sovereignty issues? This book uses a territorial bargaining game framework to analyze various stages of dispute initiation, escalation, and de-escalation in a consistent and systematic manner. It starts from an assumption that territory involves mixed motive games, which can be characterized as having elements of partnership, competition, and conflict. Consistent with conventional wisdom, this book finds that the combination of resource competition, fluid geopolitics, and unstable domestic power dynamics has regularly brought about the initiation and escalation of the three island disputes. More importantly, this book discovers that the pacific influence of economic interdependence has repeatedly prevented the sovereignty disputes from escalating into a full-scale diplomatic and/or military crisis 0aSOCIAL SCIENCES. 0aECONOMICS. 0aDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS. 0aINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. 0aREGIONAL ECONOMICS. 0aPOLITICAL SCIENCE.14aSOCIAL SCIENCES.24aPOLITICAL SCIENCE.24aDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS.24aINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS.24aECONOMICS GENERAL.24aREGIONAL/SPATIAL SCIENCE.2 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer eBooks08iPrinted edition:z9780387896694 0aThe Political Economy of the Asia Pacific,x1866-650740uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-89670-0zVer el texto completo en las instalaciones del CICY